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What can be said of the Fish Committee beyond the damning indictment provided by the 
journalist Walter Goodman half a century ago? For years after it completed its work, 
Goodman noted, “critics were still pointing out that it took testimony from 225 witnesses in 
fourteen cities, produced a voluminous report, and passed at once into obscurity.”2 Even 
while the committee was conducting its investigations, between June and December 1930, 
newspapers and the general public showed little interest in its findings, distracted by the more 
pressing problems of rising unemployment and recession. When after a month in Washington 
the committee traveled to New York, then further afield, the New York Times commented that 
it had passed through the city “almost unnoticed.” Even Pravda reportedly mocked the 
Committee as a sideshow.3 The committee’s calls for a strengthened Federal Bureau of 
Investigation were widely rejected as excessive and unnecessary, the New York Times noting 
that “watchfulness without panic is plainly the method which the great majority of Americans 
would wish to see applied”.4 No legislation followed the submission of concluding 
recommendations to Congress, and no lucrative speaking tours followed for its members, 
who more or less vanished from the congressional record after the hearings ended.5 Only the 
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chairman and leading light, the aristocratic, charming and somewhat feckless Republican 
from upstate New York, Hamilton Fish III, continued his restless search for political 
celebrity; leading him later in the decade to the anti-interventionist movement and an 
outspoken policy of Nazi appeasement that would ruin his reputation and see him 
gerrymandered out of office by his own party in the later years of World War Two. 
For good or ill, the Fish Committee merits the singular qualification of being the only 
anticommunist investigative committee in American history to have failed entirely to have a 
substantial political impact, either in terms of legislation or influence over public debate, 
begging the question why this particular dog did not bark when so many others did. After all, 
many of the features that historians have identified as underlying causes of anticommunist 
fearfulness were clearly present in 1930, including a widespread sense of alienation from the 
processes of modernization, urbanization and industrial mass production; continuing tensions 
between deskilled industrial laborers, poor rural workers and employers over pay, conditions 
and the right to organize; anxieties among ruling elites over their potential displacement by 
rising social and ethnic groups; and large numbers of non-assimilated immigrants living in 
the nation’s cities, borderlands and industrial regions. Nor were the committee’s complaints 
entirely without substance: Fish and his colleagues publicized specific and damning evidence 
about the Gulag, three decades before Solzhenitsyn’s works were published in the West, and 
uncovered suggestive material relating to covert Soviet activities in the United States, an 
issue that would be central to resurgent anticommunist politics in the years after World War 
Two. If the party, as always, remained a miniscule presence in American life, the changes in 
the Soviet line that stemmed from Stalin’s consolidation of power in Russia, most 
importantly the declaration of the “Third Period” in 1928, had given orthodox Communism a 
millenarian thrust that had been absent for much of the mid-1920s. Communists seemed to be 
riding the crest of a wave of political polarization, something that had the potential to open 
the party to a wider audience and open bloody wounds in American society. This was a cause 
of great disquiet to their foes.  
Local level repression of political activism had surged in response to depression-
related discontent, especially in terms of labor-employer disputes, yet this was not paralleled 
by anticommunist action at the national level.6 Despite the clear preconditions for Red Scare 
politics, Representative Fish’s committee was unable to provide the spark to produce a 
national public outcry or to pass legislation to control radical activities. Indeed, inasmuch as 
it offered an unconvincing critique of communism, the committee’s exertions ended up 
strengthening claims that antiradical fears were simply a bugbear promoted by elites to 
preserve their privileges and resist reform. 
Undoubtedly, part of the blame for this failure can be laid at the feet of the organizers, 
especially the chairman, who consistently overpromised and under-delivered. Even Fish’s 
personal assets turned out to be political liabilities. His polite, meandering approach in the 
chair was a major departure from the hectoring tones one normally associates with 
anticommunist committees, yet rarely produced the kinds of clashes likely to generate 
journalistic interest. Anticipating attacks from the left, Fish claimed to be developing a 
rigorous case against Communism on the basis of “facts” and “evidence”, not accusations and 
opinion. Yet he and his peers were unable to avoid giving in to their own conservative 
prejudices when conducting the hearings. He attempted to marshal public anger over the 
economic crisis by blaming it on Communist machinations, but this failed to appeal either to 
business leaders or the suffering masses. Rather than strengthening his credibility, Fish’s 
failed attempts at rigor saw him satisfy neither rationalists nor ideologues, while a series of 
blunders undermined key opportunities for the kinds of spectacular revelations that generally 
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led to front page coverage. Fish ended up expressing neither the force of deep expertise nor 
the explosiveness of McCarthyite histrionics. Rather than praising him for his restraint or 
fearing his excess, Fish was mocked for his flimsiness.  
Nevertheless, one cannot entirely separate these individual failings from the more 
systemic weaknesses of anticommunist politics in the depression years. The line adopted by 
the committee, a mistaken attempt to link anger over the depression to a more traditional 
anticommunist agenda and to pre-empt liberal attacks by focusing heavily on Communist 
institutions rather than the left as a whole, was due to circumstance as well as philosophy. 
Many of the key groups that normally propelled the right wing into anticommunist politics – 
patriotic organizations, federal investigators, bureaucrats and big businessmen – were divided 
among themselves, had been exposed as incompetent or were disengaged from the debate. 
Meanwhile, many of those who made the most effective case against revolutionary radicalism 
– especially anticommunists in the union movement – used fears of Communism to lobby for 
reform rather than repression. The outcome was a discordant political message with 
contradictory conclusions that satisfied neither right nor left and failed to persuade the public 
that Communist activities were a pressing issue of national security. Only once a new set of 
anticommunist alliances began to develop later in the 1930s, when anticommunist politics 
was driven primarily by a new coalition of business groups, anti-federal populists and 
southern segregationists, would anticommunists again be able to substantively impact the 




Hamilton Fish was a fascinating and in many ways characteristic exemplar of the patrician 
order that still retained influence in East Coast politics in the interwar years. The Fish family 
traced their origins to Peter Stuyvesant, the Dutch colonial governor of New York, and 
Thomas Hooker, the founder of Connecticut colony. Later scions boasted histories of proud 
public engagement in both state and national politics; Fish’s grandfather had been Secretary 
of State under Ulysses S. Grant. Fish was named after a cousin who had died in the Spanish-
American War fighting with the “Rough Riders”, and there can be little doubt that TR’s 
image shone brightly in Fish’s mind. While he demonstrated less of the roving intellect so 
characteristic of the 26th President, he shared many of Roosevelt’s personal values, including 
an enthusiasm for energetic outdoor activity and spirited gamesmanship, and for the army as 
a workshop of a republican, democratic order. Fish had led the 369th Infantry in World War 
One, was inducted into the Légion d’honneur for his service in France, acted as a founding 
member of the American Legion in 1919 alongside Theodore Roosevelt Jr., and authored the 
bill providing for the return of the unknown soldier to Arlington National Cemetery. Despite 
his aristocratic heritage, he prided himself on affecting no airs and graces, and – like 
Roosevelt before him – believed that elite status came with an obligation to further 
progressive reform for the benefit of the less fortunate: even to the point of supporting social 
security, minimum wage and anti-lynching laws in the New Deal years.7 
After his election to congress in 1920, though, Fish had struggled to find an 
appropriate outlet for his patriotic energies, and the later years of the decade saw him 
engaged in what seemed like a scatter-gun search for an issue of public concern he might 
focus upon. In July, August and September of 1929 alone, Fish was quoted in the press 
denouncing Jim Crow laws in the South and praising the African American war record, 
defending the Kellogg-Briand pact as a glorious bloodless revolution for peace, attacking 
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Franklin Roosevelt and Tammany Hall, calling for a US military intervention to defend 
Jewish settlers against Arab violence in Palestine and involving himself in a complicated 
debate with various political opponents, the State Banking Department, a judge and J. P. 
Morgan over the proposed construction of a canal connecting the Great Lakes to St. 
Lawrence. Indeed, later in the year, he launched another ball into the air, correcting several 
misstatements in an ongoing debate over who was the tallest President.8  
While anticommunism was undoubtedly a deeply-held commitment, then, there can 
be no doubt that it also offered a chance for an aspiring politician to attach his name to an 
issue in a way that would have offered clear advantages in any future bid for power within 
the Republican party apparatus. As the effects of the depression had become increasingly 
visible, society had polarized over the issue of political radicalism. Many of the antiradical 
groups that had emerged during and after World War One remained active and energetic, but 
were confronted by a growing civil liberties-based opposition. Pressure was building for the 
recognition of Soviet Russia: the United States was the last great power not to have 
established formal ties with the Communist regime. However, opponents of recognition were 
given a fillip after reports of the persecution of Russian Jews and orchestrated attacks on 
Christianity were circulated in late 1929 and early 1930.9 Indeed, opposition to the Soviet 
Union on religious grounds was as strong if not stronger than hostility to the “socialist” 
economics the nation also embodied. At home, unemployment protests in which radical 
activists loomed large descended into violence as demonstrators and police fought for control 
of the streets, but opinions starkly divided over who was culpable. A number of senior 
Communists – including the party leader, William Z. Foster – were tried and briefly 
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imprisoned for allegedly provoking violence; however, liberals and socialists warned against 
a resurgence of “the lawless activities of Attorney General Palmer in 1919” and called for 
public hearings into police brutality.10 Tensions continued to build in 1930 after three 
Communists, Alfred Luro, Steve Katovis and Gonzalo Gonzales, were killed during separate 
altercations with the police. 
If resurgent anticommunist feeling explained the appeal of the issue to the Republican 
representative, then growing resistance to the same politics of anticommunism may explain 
why Fish sought to distinguish his case against the Reds from the more sweeping and 
uncritical forms of antiradicalism that had done so much damage to the credibility of the 
movement in previous years. In a statement issued to the press at the opening of the hearings, 
Fish declared that “this committee does not propose to investigate socialism, radicalism or 
pacifism as such, nor does it seek to interfere with the political beliefs of any one in this 
country, nor with the rights of American citizens to freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”11 Instead, his indictment centered on three key assertions: that the Soviet 
Union was single-mindedly focused on the destruction of the American system of 
government; that the Communist Party in America was entirely a tool of Soviet foreign 
policy; and that to achieve their revolutionary goals Communists sought to exploit 
vulnerabilities in American society and undermine the social contract: orchestrating riots and 
strikes among unemployed or suffering workers, using the Soviet Union’s economic muscle 
to destabilize American businesses and markets, provoking hostility among ethnic and racial 
minorities, causing people to question their faith in religion, and inciting America’s young 
people to rebel against existing structures of social, pedagogical and familial authority.12 Fish 
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also argued that the current economic crisis could in large part be blamed on subversive 
efforts by Communists to destabilize the economy.  
This line substantially differed from figures further to the right who expressed little or 
no interest in the difference between pro-Stalinist Communists and other actors on the left 
and center of American political life. Taken together, it was an almost exact inversion of the 
orthodox Communist view of the committee, which depicted Fish and his fellow 
congressmen as part of a general effort among the capitalist classes to prepare the public for 
an imperialist war against Russia, as the stooge of Wall Street and corporate interests, and in 
denial that it was the contradictions of capitalism, not the agitation of Communists, that made 
social harmony impossible.13 The committee declared that Communism was not a legitimate 
political movement because it sought the overthrow of the American government through 
force and violence; Communists insisted that while any revolution would naturally end in 
violence this would stem from the actions of capitalists attempting to hold onto power.14 
In short, the committee focused on the Soviet Union, the relationship between the 
Communist International and the Communist Party of America, and the role played by 
Communists in the various Communist-dominated organizations through which the party 
worked. The only significant exception to this rule was the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU): which was non-partisan but had a small number of Communists in senior positions 
and a reputation as the most outspoken defender of dissenters’ rights, for which Fish and 
several witnesses pounded them incessantly.15 
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“education” and “investigation” campaigns from radical “propaganda” activities; however, 
the depression crisis and poor record anticommunists had earned for smearing and 
misdirection in previous years gave this language a new importance. To demonstrate its rigor, 
the committee studied Marxist-Leninist tracts, records of Communist Party proceedings and 
translations of the Soviet constitution.16 Witnesses straying too far from the topic or 
speculating too wildly were warned to refocus their testimony on party organs and activities, 
and to avoid personal attacks and hearsay, while on several occasions Fish opened sessions 
by repeating his initial declaration that the committee had no interest in investigating 
socialists, pacifists or liberals.17 “The only bad thing [Fish] could say about Socialist Norman 
Thomas,” the historian Richard Gid Powers notes, “was that he had gone to Princeton.”18 
Meanwhile, the most common lawyerly tactic deployed by the congressmen was not bullying 
and defamation insulated by congressional privilege, but damning through excessive 
civility.19 Tactically, at least, the committeemen were more Joseph Welch than Joseph 
McCarthy. 
One of Fish’s key early witnesses was the Jesuit priest and founder of Georgetown’s 
School of Foreign Service, Father Edmund A. Walsh: a man whose attitude toward 
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Communism had been fixed by his experiences during a Vatican-sponsored famine relief 
mission to Russia in 1922-3.20 As with many Christian anticommunists, the foundation of 
Walsh’s personal opposition to the Soviet Union lay in a vision of Communism as the 
paramount force of organized atheism in the modern world. However, while he discussed this 
before the committee Walsh stressed that the geopolitical antagonism between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was at root a clash of political philosophies.21 To him, Marxism-
Leninism fundamentally conflicted with liberal republicanism because it declared all areas of 
society to be parts of a unified political whole, unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition which 
designated certain key realms – the individual, the home, the community, the church – as 
‘non-political’ spheres off-limits to state action. In this sense, Walsh’s arguments grew from 
traditions of popular democratic anti-Europeanism that had infused American identity with a 
profound hostility to the centralized political systems of the Old World; although the 
Protestant underpinnings of this were downplayed by Walsh in his generalized assertion of 
the importance of non-sectarian Christian anticommunism. Walsh also claimed that the 
Soviets were using trade policy to conduct “economic warfare” against the United States. He 
argued that the Soviets were using predatory pricing strategies to destroy American 
businesses by swamping them with cheap Russian imports. Over time, this would induce a 
state of dependency, weakening America’s capacity in any future war between the two 
nations.22 Fish followed up by arguing that Communists in America had been instigators of 
the current depression crisis, not least by creating tensions between employees and employers 
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that ground down American business, and later in the hearings claimed that radicals had been 
promoting “whispering campaigns” in order to precipitate runs on banks.23 
Clearly, this “economic warfare” theory represented an opportunistic attempt to link 
pressing public concerns over the economy to the presence of Communists in America (and 
the world). However, as well as suiting the autarchic temper of the times, it anticipated 
broader tendencies among conservatives in later years to present their hostility to 
Communism in terms of free market economics; as with the enthusiasm for Friedrich 
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom or the writings of Ayn Rand.24  
For 1930, this was a novel approach to explaining US-Soviet relations; and in the 
months following the Wall Street crash was certainly brave, if not foolhardy. The basic 
premise that politics and ideology were interfering with a “natural” pattern of free commerce 
was leveled at many nations in the aftermath of the near total collapse of international comity 
following the crash: as, for example, with claims that French “golden bullets” had caused the 
collapse of the central European banking sector and subsequent global depression.25 But 
authors and political actors who specifically thought about “economic warfare” in the 
interwar years tended to use the term to refer to strategies for targeting an enemy’s productive 
capacity during military conflict.26 Arguably, the closest echoes of Walsh’s arguments about 
a hidden economic war being waged against America could be found in the Marxist tradition 
to which he was responding: especially the Leninist attack on empire as a search for markets, 
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or arguments that the American government had used trade and fiscal policies to achieve 
dominance in the Caribbean, Latin America and Asia. 
Later in the decade, the financial journalist Paul Einzig’s Bloodless Invasion (1938) 
suggested that Nazi ambitions had been promoted prior to open warfare through the 
economic penetration of the Danube Basin and the Balkans by a secret “Nazi International”.27 
By the time of the Cold War, the language of military struggle would be regularly used in 
reference to not only the economic but also the social and cultural spheres when describing 
the confrontation between East and West. In this sense, Edmund Walsh and the Fish 
Committee were ahead of their time. However, in another way this was a very traditional 
American argument. By linking moral outrage with economic self-interest, the effort to 
articulate an idea of Soviet economic warfare resembled the kind of free labor arguments that 
were so effective in mobilizing the North against the “slave power conspiracy” before the 
Civil War. It also picked up on anti-trust traditions in American political discourse. Walsh 
took ideas about the dangers of anti-competitive business practices in the commercial sphere 
and applied them to geopolitics, following a broader early twentieth century tendency to shift 
the language and ideals of American business into the conduct of foreign affairs.28 He argued 
that since the Soviet Union exercised total control over its productive base through state-
owned industrial and commercial enterprises, export cartels and foreign trade bodies, it was 
able to use monopoly influence in international commerce to promote a revolutionary agenda 
around the world. 
Walsh’s stress on clashing political philosophies and use of economistic arguments to 
structure his approach to international relations was useful to the committee, not least because 
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it allowed Fish to distance himself from several strands of anti-Semitic, ultra-conspiratorial or 
racially-derived anticommunism that were in circulation in the interwar years. Unlike the 
earlier anticommunist investigations at a state and national level headed by Lee Slater 
Overman and Clayton Lusk, none of the Fish Committee members and only a few of their 
witnesses claimed that Soviet Communism was part of a deep rationalist-collectivist 
conspiracy dating back to Adam Weishaupt and the Order of the Illuminati: a trope common 
among ahistorical right-wing conspiracy theorists who had been influenced by extremist 
writers such as the British anti-Semite and fascist, Nesta Webster, as well as many religious 
radicals who saw the Soviet Union as just another front in the eternal battle against Satan.29 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which had fuelled theories of the Bolshevik state as the 
manifestation of a hidden conspiracy to engineer a Jewish world government, made no 
appearance; despite the fact that Fish would be accused later in the decade of using his 
congressional office to circulate the Protocols to isolationist supporters.30 When witnesses 
made casually racist remarks about Jews, Italians and Greeks as temperamentally more 
inclined to adopt radical ideologies, the chairman intervened to stress the patriotic loyalty of 
minority groups.31 At one point, Fish repeated a claim that had been suggested to him by a 
Russian immigrant and former member of the Industrial Workers of the World: that the 
correlation between non-citizenship and revolutionary radicalism was the result of social 
conditioning rather than racial or national character; the experience of repression in Europe 
had accustomed immigrants to be hostile to all forms of government, a view they had 
“received with their mother’s milk” and had left them unable to see that the United States was 
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qualitatively different to the undemocratic countries they had left.32 Fish continued to 
associate radicalism with immigrants, but emphasized this was a political and cultural, not a 
racial, phenomenon. Though he supplied no evidence to support the claim, Fish even 
implausibly suggested that Communism in the black community was linked solely to West 
Indian immigrants, not natural born citizens.33 Fish had been regimental commander of the 
369th Regiment in World War One – the “Harlem Hellfighters” were the first African 
American regiment to serve during the war – was a fervent opponent of lynching and was 
outraged by suggestions of black disloyalty. When one black ex-Communist claimed that 
there were 100,000 African American Communists in the Southern states ready to revolt, 
Fish vigorously dissented, pointing out that “by and large, the colored people in this country, 
men and women, are Christians who attend church and believe in God and … the communists 
teach hatred of God”.34 To support his view, he called upon black liberal leaders such as 
Illinois Congressman Oscar de Priest and the union leader A. Philip Randolph, who were 
eager to distance black people from any taint of communism for understandable reasons of 
their own, and conservative churchmen such as the Baptist preacher Dr. William A. 
Venerable, who when quizzed by the chair about the influence of communism in his church 
wryly remarked that he had generally found “more among the Methodists,” much to the 
amusement of the audience.35 
Clearly, then, the chairman was more of a conservative than a right-wing radical in his 
anticommunist politics, at least at a point in his career when he still aspired to a position of 
national leadership within the Republican Party. Nor were his fellow congressmen especially 
extreme in their analysis, although the presence of Carl Bachmann of West Virginia, Edward 
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E. Eslick of Tennessee, and Robert Hall of Mississippi – with Bachmann playing a 
particularly vocal role – did give the committee a distinctly Southern feel. The hearings thus 
presented a less extreme indictment of Communism than that offered by more radical 
counter-subversives, who were either excluded from the witness rosters or carefully managed 
when giving evidence. It offered a critique shaped by anti-authoritarian and free market 
capitalist political assumptions, a whole-hearted endorsement of American political 
institutions, a rejection of simple ethnic determinism, and a focus upon Communist 
institutions rather than on the left as a whole. Indeed, their detailed analyses of Communist 
activity were founded on substantive evidence and were sometimes plausible and convincing. 
Among other things, the committee uncovered some of the first evidence of Soviet 
covert operations in the United States: an issue that would become a central part of the 
anticommunist debate after World War Two. The most revealing discoveries came from 
some of the earliest Soviet defectors, who shed light on the role of secret agents working 
within Amtorg: the Soviet trading bureau in New York that, in the absence of formal 
diplomatic infrastructure, had come to resemble something close to a Soviet embassy in the 
public mind.36 Edmund Walsh presented information that had come from the published 
memoirs of a senior defector from the Parisian Embassy, Grigori Bessedovsky, who had been 
scheduled to take up post as president of Amtorg but was diverted at the last minute. 
Bessedovsky had abandoned Communism after he came under suspicion of disloyalty and 
subsequently released a slew of self-justifying accounts of the secret side of Soviet 
diplomacy.37 Much of this material had so far only been published in French. The most 
important witness to appear in person before the committee was Basil Delgass, who until 
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recently had been the Vice President of Amtorg. Delgass had been summoned back to 
Moscow a few months prior to the hearings’ commencement and, fearing for his safety, 
resigned once the Fish Committee began and offered to testify against his former colleagues. 
Delgass declared that Amtorg was systematically lying about the presence of Soviet secret 
police (OGPU) operatives on American shores. He claimed that the current president, Peter 
A. Bogdanov, and his office manager Feodor Mikhailovich Ziavkin were political appointees 
and in all likelihood members of the Soviet secret service themselves; a claim substantiated 
by another émigré witness.38 Delgass also stated that there was a hidden party cell within the 
bureau whose members passed themselves off as trade delegates while they conducted covert 
operations. He ridiculed the idea that it was possible to have such an important bureau in the 
United States without close supervision from the secret apparatus.39 Witnesses from Amtorg 
claimed that their employees were either not Communists or had left the party before coming 
to the United States; this was shown to be largely an administrative fiction designed to 
overcome visa and immigration issues in the wake of the 1918 Immigration Act, which made 
it a deportable offense to belong to an organization committed to the overthrow of the United 
States government by force or violence. 
In uncovering this material, the committee did not concern itself with the distinction 
between espionage conducted against the American government and crucial industries, of 
which there was relatively little evidence uncovered, and Soviet efforts to monitor their own 
people while they worked in foreign lands, which was clearly endemic. Nevertheless, the 
testimony suggested much about how deeply the habits of a surveillance state had come to 
shape the Communist world.40 
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While Soviet espionage activities in the United States spoke most directly to the 
committee’s claims about a national security threat at home, arguably the committee’s most 
important efforts were in publicizing the testimony of journalists, Russian exiles and former 
Communists about the conditions of millions of Soviet prisoners held in the labor camps 
known as the Gulag.41 This stretched far beyond the committee’s mandate, which was only to 
investigate Communist activities in the United States. Nevertheless, the congressmen 
effectively ignored their brief by claiming – in line with the “economic warfare” hypothesis – 
that the Soviet Union was exporting goods to the United States that had been effectively 
produced by slave labor. This, they argued, was not only a moral outrage but also a violation 
of anti-dumping laws. It was also, in their terms, a domestic issue since it threatened to push 
American businesses into bankruptcy. The theme of “Soviet slave labor” had been developed 
sporadically in the past by anticommunist politicians, but now was given full rein through a 
detailed study of Russian labor practices.42 
Despite the best Soviet efforts to keep foreigners away from and unaware of the 
Gulag, after several years of large-scale operation it had become increasingly possible to 
construct a surprisingly detailed picture of life in the camps.43 Although mention was made of 
forced labor in the Doretz Basin mines, Karelia, the forests around Kirov Oblast, and regions 
of collectivized farming in the Ukraine, the committee principally focused on the lumber 
camps on the mainland close to Solovetski Island, where several hundred thousand people 
were being worked to death to produce material for commercial exportation. This was on the 
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grounds that such activities could be directly traced to trade with the United States. Witnesses 
provided information on conditions, working hours, rates of pay and nutrition, as well as 
estimates of export volumes. The most powerful testimony was of course the anecdotal 
experiences of escapees and their families. Alexander Lukovitz, who had fled to the United 
States after a harrowing escape from the camps through Finland in 1929, told the committee 
he had endured 16 to 18 hour days cutting wood in freezing weather, fed only on salted fish 
heads, black bread and thin barley soup, and sleeping at night in damp, overfilled barracks. In 
an environment that resembled something akin to a Darwinian nightmare, those who couldn’t 
keep up with the vicious work routine were stripped naked and made to stand on freezing tree 
stumps, cudgeled to death, or simply shot by guards. Meanwhile, typhus, scurvy, gangrene 
and a variety of other diseases were common and lethal.44 Another witness, an indigent 
Latvian merchant sailor named Alexander Grube, told how he had been arrested after going 
ashore illegally in Russia and had been imprisoned by the OGPU for four months before 
being sent to the labor camps for two and a half years. Because of his rough and rambling 
manner, several of the representatives doubted the wisdom of hearing Grube’s testimony, but 
Fish insisted on it. As a result, the committee heard how Grube had been sent on lumber 
details in which literally thousands of prisoners had died from malnourishment and 
overwork.45 
Communist witnesses explicitly denied the existence or the scale of the camps, or that 
the Soviet system would ever make use of forced labor.46 These denials formed part of a 
broader set of implausible arguments about the character of international Communism put 
forward by its American defenders: that the Soviet leadership had no responsibility for the 
activities of the Comintern; that Russians working for the Soviet government in the United 
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States were non-political appointees; that workers’ conditions in proletarian Russia were 
sublime; and that Stalin did not really run the Soviet government since he was only the head 
of the Communist Party.47 These were joined by self-justifying circumlocutions, as when, 
confronted with the apparent contradiction between Communist demands for constitutional 
protection in the United States and their refusal to accord similar rights to protestors in 
Russia, William Z. Foster explained: “The worker in America who fights for the program of 
the Communist Party is a fighter for the progress of society in general. The capitalist who 
proposes the overthrow of the Soviet Government is an enemy of the human society”.48 
Others on the non-Communist left – unaware or unwilling to listen to evidence of 
Soviet repression and hopeful that socialist politics more generally offered a way out of the 
crisis of capitalism in which the nation found itself – also rejected, and even mocked, the 
evidence raised by the committee on these issues. One writer for The Nation described Fish’s 
decision to question Amtorg’s president Bogdanov about the origins of Soviet exports as 
“play[ing] medicine ball with a man who is in charge of trade worth at least $100,000,000 a 
year to the United States,” and dismissed debates over the patterns of control within the 
international Communist movement as “tedious metaphysical discussions.”49 In a particularly 
extreme ad hominem attack in The New Republic, Edmund Wilson denounced one escapee 
from the Gulag as “one of the most untrustworthy characters who has surely ever been called 
upon to testify to anything, a pale-eyed, shifty-eyed, shaved-headed man, represented as an 
honest Russian farmer sent to prison for criticizing the Soviets”. Several decades later, when 
republishing the piece in a collection of essays, Wilson apologized for his comments, noting 
they were the “kind of thing that is to be sedulously avoided by honest reporters. On the 
strength of a physical impression and solely out of sympathy toward the Soviet Union about 
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which at firsthand I knew nothing, I assumed that this man was lying. His experience may 
well have intimidated him and turned his face grey, and he may well have been made uneasy 
by the presence of the American Communists. I leave my report of the incident as an example 




Despite their comparatively moderate conservatism and important achievements in 
publicizing issues of global humanitarian significance, though, the committee and its 
carefully chosen witnesses ultimately failed to live up to their high aspirations of objectivity 
or to deflect accusations of systematic bias sufficiently to gain a wide hearing for their ideas. 
Defining the conflict between Russia and America in terms of a clash of competing political 
philosophies may have been an advance on social Darwinist visions of anticommunism as 
volkskreig, but it still permitted fundamentalist readings that left little space for a more open 
examination of the historical evidence or an ironic and nuanced understanding of the 
complex, often conflicted behavior of Communists. In Walsh’s words, the Bolshevik 
revolution had been “entirely different … from every other revolution that the world has ever 
known” because it had been founded with the intention to “block out, lock, stock and barrel, 
every form of civilization whatever, whether they knew anything about it or not”. As such, it 
represented a “frank and open declaration of war against all humanity”.51 None of this 
rhetoric helped explain why Americans joined or aligned with the party. The committee also 
often took Communists’ statements of their large and growing influence at face value rather 
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than recognizing such statements might be conditioned by Communists’ own delusions of 
grandeur.52 By contrast, it almost completely ignored evidence of the compromises that 
Bolshevik ideologues had made when putting their ideas into practice, the ways the 
aspirations of the Communist movement had been shaped by Russian power politics, and the 
manner in which American Communists struggled to reconcile their global, revolutionary 
ideology with tendencies toward localism and nationalism: all of which would have 
substantial implications for devising policies to undermine the appeal of revolutionary 
politics in America and the world. Not only was this a dogmatic vision, it offered little appeal 
to a public that conceived of America’s exceptionalism as lying in its commitment to liberty. 
Were Fish’s arguments about the scale and unity of the Communist conspiracy to have been 
accepted, they would have required a vast array of new police powers, something that held as 
little appeal for traditional conservatives, states’ rights advocates and populists as it did for 
civil liberties activists. Whether it was party organizers helping strikers in repressive 
company towns, radical lawyers defending imprisoned revolutionaries or angry young 
teenagers picking fights with rivals in school, according to Fish all Communist actions should 
be seen as part of a singular master plan directed from Moscow and focused upon the 
destruction of American civilization. 
Moreover, as inventive as it may have been, Walsh’s concept of Soviet economic 
warfare offered a simplistic account of Soviet behavior just as other economistic explanations 
of international affairs tended to reduce the complexity of national behavior to a single index. 
The more straightforward explanation for Russian trade policies – that Stalin was using 
primary exports to build up currency reserves in order to fund breakneck industrialization – 
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could certainly accommodate an eventual goal of worldwide revolution, but it suggested that 
the US could not only influence Soviet economic policy but also that the American economy 
stood to benefit from the sale of industrial goods and services to a rapidly industrializing 
Russia, rather than being driven into the ground by accepting cheap primary imports. It 
obscured the tension between the Soviet need for foreign technical expertise and the Stalinist 
desire for isolation, as manifested through the contrast between the amelioristic policies of 
the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) and Amtorg, and the more radical agenda 
of the Third International (Comintern). Perhaps most importantly, it entirely ignored the fact 
that France, Britain and the United States held the overwhelming majority of the world’s gold 
reserves and were thus the only states with genuinely monopolistic potential in international 
commerce. If the Soviets had subsumed their economic policy to political goals, which they 
undoubtedly had, it was more accurate to see this as part of a desperate effort to catch up with 
the capitalist world than the actions of an all-powerful monopoly threatening the security of a 
weak and febrile America. Stalin’s policies were driven by a near-paranoid fear of capitalist 
“encirclement” rather than an ambitious agenda to remodel the world. The substantive 
components of anticommunist thought were therefore undermined by a sense of American 
victimhood and national fragility that simply did not hold up to the United States’ position as 
the first or second most powerful nation in the world. 
While stepping back from the worst and most overt extremes of racism, the veneer of 
objectivity laid over the committee’s work did little to obscure the underlying prejudices 
which shaped the congressmen’s worldviews. Even while the chairman made great effort to 
stress the patriotic loyalty of immigrant groups, the premises underpinning the committee’s 
work equated ethnic groups at a basic level with children and youths on the grounds that a 
shared irrationality left them more vulnerable to subversive propaganda than mature Anglo-
Saxon Americans; a position that was used to justify immigration restriction as a quick and 
easy solution to America’s problems with radicalism. Even Fish’s avowals of African 
American loyalty were so repetitive that it is hard not to see in them the peculiar cognitive 
patterns that originally emerged from American ‘Sambo’ stereotypes: whites determined to 
stress that African Americans were among the most loyal social groups and content with their 
lot, yet anxious to the point of obsession that secretly they might not be.53 A whistle-stop tour 
through Chattanooga, Memphis, New Orleans, Birmingham and Atlanta was designed to 
meet his southern colleagues’ desire to assess the danger Communism posed to the Southern 
racial order, and the influence of Communists among black people was one of the most 
common questions raised by the committee elsewhere as well. In response to accusations of 
racism leveled by William Z. Foster, the Southern congressmen vigorously denied there was 
a problem with lynching in the South except in the rare occasions when it was necessary to 
preserve Southern women’s honor, while even the token liberal on the committee, 
Representative John E. Nelson of Maine, engaged in exchanges with witnesses on the stand 
about the susceptibility of “darkies” to radical utopian promises.54 
While they were fodder for the committee’s critics, such prejudices conversely did 
little to strengthen the anticommunist agenda among its supporters. Efforts to envision 
Communists as a new form of carpetbagger lacked salience as long as white supremacy 
remained firmly entrenched in the South and it was still assumed, in Hall’s words, that “the 
Southern Negro is too wise to listen to this social equality propaganda that they put out”.55 
Father Edmund Walsh informed the committee that “the large mass of negroes, especially in 
the South, as I know rather well, are considered a conservative element, rather than an 
inflammatory element.”56 Until the New Deal years, when government action raised the real 
possibility that the state, in combination with an emerging civil rights movement, might 
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genuinely upset the racial order in the South, the equation of communism with African 
American protest remained a minority pursuit and white supremacists contented themselves 
with self-justifying beliefs that black people were generally satisfied with their lot. 
An equally strongly set of gendered prejudices running through the committee’s 
descriptions of Communism offered greater potential for winning supporters to the 
anticommunist cause by presenting the radical project as an inversion of gender norms and a 
threat to the sanctity of the home. The congressmen repeatedly enquired into rumors that 
Communists had a policy of cynically placing women and children at the front of violent 
demonstrations in the hope of generating effective propaganda of police brutality.57 Inspector 
John Lyons of the New York Police Department’s Anti-Radical Bureau said that he had seen 
women and children pushed up during strikes, “while the men skulk behind the women and 
children and throw bricks and other missiles at the police.”58 Despite being denied by other 
witnesses, these claims served to reinforce the idea that revolutionary radicals were set upon 
destroying traditional male and female roles – in this case, the male’s responsibility to protect 
women from harm – which in turn spoke to anxieties about masculinity in the context of a 
climate of widespread unemployment and social instability.59 Other witnesses expressed 
disgust at the un-feminine behavior of female Communists. One union activist explained, 
“The women communists were equally as bad as the men. They were mad fanatics. They all 
carried Gillette safety razor blades, and in this mass of people trying to get to work these 
women would walk behind our women, behind our men and slash them down the back with 
these razors.”60 The editor of Labor World, Louis McGrew, declared that under a communist 
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state women were turned into prostitutes and their families were declared property of the 
state; echoing claims heard before earlier congressional committees that Communists 
practiced “free love” and the “nationalization of women”.61 Meanwhile, conservative women 
in the Daughters of the American Revolution used their gendered status to privilege their 
attacks on communism, as when Mrs. Ruben Ross Holloway explained that, as “a mother, 
and the grandmother of six children” she was particularly concerned that educators were not 
required to take the pledge of allegiance.62 
Given this tendency to trade on group identity to justify anticommunist views, it was 
perhaps unsurprising that the most salacious interest expressed by the committee was when 
race and gender intermingled, as with claims that Communists were using white women at 
interracial dances to seduce black men into joining the party.63 A representative of the ultra-
patriotic American Vigilant Intelligence Federation declared that there had been at least three 
dances in recent months in Chicago, “in which Japanese, Filipinos, Chinese, Negroes, and 
whites all intermingled and danced together.” To the concern of the congressmen, he reported 
that a member of the AFL news service who attended one such event had told him that the 
“white girls at that dance would not dance with the white men and the negro girls would not 
dance with the negro men; in other words, the theory was that they should not dance with 
their own races, but should dance with those of the opposite races”.64 The sexual implications 
of such forms of interracial congress were left unsaid, but clear to all. 
Despite professions of open-mindedness and investigative rigor, then, the committee 
repeatedly showed itself to be subject to a set of prejudicial assumptions that clouded their 
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understanding of Communism, weakened their diagnoses for dealing with revolutionary 
politics and aided critics in presenting the committee as more interested in defending 
conservative values than in challenging Communism. The committee’s depiction of the 
relationship between non-citizenship and political radicalism as a cultural inheritance 
stemming from the experience of growing up in repressive regimes abroad encouraged them 
to emphasize education, especially the teaching of American history, alongside more 
straightforwardly repressive policing activities and restrictions on immigration as ways of 
dealing with Bolshevism.65 But it also shifted attention away from poverty, social exclusion 
and political repression in America as causes of Communist growth. Meanwhile, the 
language of objectivity was often used to close off debate at the point when liberal ideas were 
put forward. The committee generally responded favorably to suggestions from conservative 
union leaders that improving the conditions of labor would reduce Communism’s appeal, but 
witnesses who suggested that police violence was acting as a tool for radical recruitment were 
told that this was not relevant to an investigative committee solely focused on Communist 
activities.66 When African American leaders argued that, as Alderman Fred R. Moore put it, 
“if Congress could adopt or enforce the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, 
protecting the negroes from the South who are lynched, I think that would help [reduce 
support for Communism]”, the committee declared that civil rights and anti-lynching bills 
were, whatever their merits, a diversion from the committee’s object of study and therefore 
not to be discussed.67 
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The tendency of the committee to interweave focused attacks on the institutions of 
international Communism with gendered, racial and class-based agenda items shows how 
hard it is to separate “anti-Communism” – opposition to the Soviet Union and its institutional 
manifestations around the world – from “anticommunism”: opposing the broader values and 
goals that were correctly or incorrectly ascribed to Communists.68 In this sense, it should not 
be surprising that, like most anticommunists, Fish revealed complex intermixtures of both 
accurate analysis and prejudice in his attacks on the “Red menace.” 
However, it is hard to see these as conscious attempts to smear by association so 
much as manifestations of the latent prejudices of the time. Indeed, when testimony 
conformed to the congressmen’s assumptions, it proved difficult for the committee to 
separate real risks from peripheral matters best addressed through studied neglect. In one 
particularly extensive wild-goose chase, the committee obsessed about Communist efforts to 
recruit children into their ranks, trading on perennial fears over the safety of young people in 
educational environments in which teachers were assumed to be politically to the left of 
parents. The Boy Scouts movement in Great Britain was created at the turn of the century in 
response to fears that modern mass education had failed to instill discipline in future 
generations. For anticommunists in the United States in the interwar years, these same fears 
were newly refracted through claims that Communism sought to destroy parental authority, 
bring about the collapse of the family and encourage the “utter debauchery of youth”.69 This 
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line of argument combined latent anxieties over young people’s sexuality with a more overt 
political hostility toward left-wing thought. As Mrs. Holloway of the Daughters of the 
American Revolution put it, “All over the country, they will tell you in the schools they have 
not the same wonderful respect from children that they had. Look into the homes and you 
will see they are taught, ‘Your bodies are your own to do with as you please,’ every place you 
go.”70 The response was to call for greater supervision over students, the curriculum and 
teaching profession, including teacher loyalty oaths and measures to oblige educators to 
“teach patriotism” to their students. According to New York’s recently retired Police 
Commissioner, Grover Whalen, these measures would “offset … seditious propaganda” by 
selling “our national ideals to the younger generation.” In an orgy of kitsch, Whalen argued, 
“We must recreate in our children the thrill of devotion that characterizes a silver-thatched 
veteran of the Civil War”, promoting activities “that aim at the building up of body and 
mental health through recreation.” This would ensure “sound thinking, hearty enjoyment of 
life, and, inevitably, a spirit of devotion to our flag and the national life which that flag so 
beautifully symbolizes.”71 
Despite extensive testimony, the committee actually found no evidence of teachers’ 
involvement in promoting radical ideas and strong evidence that the tiny number of young 
Communists identified by school officials were influenced by their radical parents.72 If 
anything, the reams of testimony from principals, superintendents and members of school 
boards showed that teachers were extraordinarily severe with young people who had become 
involved in radical politics. A fourteen-year-old child from the Bronx was suspended for 
refusing to give the pledge, despite later pleading that she didn’t even know what she was 
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doing wrong.73 Another student, Harry Iseman, who persistently refused to accept his 
school’s orders banning him from handing out leaflets, was suspended. After getting involved 
in an altercation with some Boy Scouts, he was sent to reform school for six months. 
Following his release, he attended a demonstration against the Scouts at Union Square and 





The limits to the committee’s objectivity were not just a matter of individual failings and 
personal prejudices. From the beginning, the committee’s efforts were shaped by a 
fragmented anticommunist community that struggled to substantiate the conservative vision 
of Communism laid out by Fish and his peers at a time when conservatism itself seemed to be 
in crisis. 
While Fish may have been acting pragmatically in his effort to link anticommunism 
with a broader selection of contemporary social anxieties, congressional support for the 
committee had been based on a narrower definition of national security than the one 
articulated by Representative Fish: namely, that Soviet agents were working in the United 
States to overthrow the American government. This was the foundational claim that 
underpinned the first wave of national security legislation passed during World War One and 
it persisted as virtually the only basis for consensus over national security restrictions to civil 
liberties in the interwar years. The resolution creating the Fish Committee had initially been 
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killed by the Rules Committee in March 1930. It was only approved after a set of documents 
were released to the press by Police Commissioner Whalen that seemed to offer conclusive 
evidence of an organized conspiracy of secret agents in Amtorg plotting against American 
institutions and working with the American Communist Party; a claim that was strengthened 
by the fact that some years earlier the equivalent organization in Britain, Arcos, had been 
caught engaging in similar activities.75 
The problem was that even before the committee began its hearings, rumors had 
begun to circulate that the crucial Whalen Documents were not genuine. In fact, they turned 
out to be not only forged, but forged so badly that they called into question either 
Commissioner Whalen’s integrity or his competence.76 (Whalen had been attacked for his 
police force’s aggressive response to a communist protest in Union Square in March, and was 
desperate to uncover evidence that would heighten the threat of Communism and justify his 
heavy-handedness.) In hearings in late July, John Spivak, a left-wing fellow traveler and 
occasional writer for the New York Graphic and Communist Daily Worker, showed how 
rudimentary detective work had led him to the printer who produced the letterheads on which 
the forged documents had been typed; a man with no link to Amtorg.77 Whalen admitted he 
had done nothing to verify the documents’ accuracy beyond accepting assurances from his 
subordinates.78 Furthermore, an employee of Amtorg identified several dozen basic errors of 
fact and language in the documents.79 
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The revelations forced Fish to distance himself from the material on which the 
committee had been founded.80 Despite the attendant embarrassment, Fish repeated almost 
exactly the same mistake several months later, when he followed another set of false leads 
supplied by the patriotic organization, the National Civic Federation, in the hope of 
uncovering a cache of Soviet espionage documents that did not exist.81 Coming at the tail-end 
of a decade which had seen repeated exposure of forged documents relating to Soviet activity 
in the Western hemisphere, these debacles consolidated an image of anticommunists as so 
viscerally hostile to Bolshevism that they were unable or unwilling to give the evidence 
before them even the most cursory analysis; an ironic turn for a committee that had staked so 
much on its single-minded focus on facts. 
Whalen’s embarrassment turned out to be only the first example of a broader pattern 
of unprofessional conduct that revealed the limits of using police forces in sensitive political 
investigations. Some of the larger forces with anti-radical bureaus or bomb squads were able 
to supply officers who had detailed knowledge of the history and development of American 
Communism. However, many policemen who testified before the hearings revealed varying 
degrees of ignorance, incompetence, aggression, casual racism and anti-Semitism, not to 
mention brazen disregard for constitutional rights. Officers openly, often proudly, explained 
how they routinely arrested radicals using petty local ordinances that banned “speeling” on 
sidewalks or parading without a permit.82 The Pittsburgh-based editor Louis McGrew assured 
the committee that the police knew how to control radicals in his city: “They just knock their 
blocks off.”83 Other witnesses explained how policemen worked closely with conservative 
groups to undermine protests, as when unemployed members of the Ku Klux Klan in 
Birmingham cooperated with the police and local business leaders in efforts to identify, 
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monitor and harass Communist organizers in their city. As the historian Robert P. Ingalls 
noted, this kind of local antiradical violence in Alabama was “purposeful and economically 
motivated”, directed against union workers and African Americans and ceasing as soon as 
labor disputes were settled.84 It also suggested that the disturbed conditions the committee 
was investigating were less a product of Communism and more down to police impunity and 
collusion. 
Although the South ran a close second, perhaps the most open admissions of police 
misconduct came in the committee’s hearings in the industrial Midwest. The region had some 
of the highest concentrations of Communist membership as well as, not coincidentally, the 
most divisive industrial environments. After the Chief of Police in Flint, Michigan, Caesar J. 
Scavarda, told the committee that he routinely arrested radicals without charge, Congressman 
Bachmann suggested that he try arresting them for disorderly conduct. Scavarda replied, 
“Well, possibly that would be a good excuse.”85 Even more egregiously, the Chief of Police 
in Pontiac, Floyd R. Alspaugh, explained his method of dealing with radicals: “We just hide 
them, that is all – bury them within the jails so that they can not get a writ out and get 
released”.86 
While it seemingly raised little concern for the committee, the routine admission of 
illegality provided opportunities for opponents to condemn Fish by association. 
Representatives of the ACLU and the Socialist Party attacked the committee for giving too 
much credence to patriotic groups and for failing to identify police corruption as a major 
recruiting tool for the Communist Party.87 “Your committee’s work is based on the 
proposition that revolutionary propaganda produces revolution,” the ACLU president Roger 
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Baldwin said when he took the stand. “All history refutes that notion. Revolutions are 
produced by unbearable conditions, not talk.”88 When the congressmen reached California, a 
hastily assembled band of civil liberties activists managed to hijack the last day of the 
hearings by recounting routine constitutional violations by the LAPD. The writer and 
socialist Upton Sinclair told how he had been arrested and held incommunicado for more 
than eighteen hours after participating in a non-partisan free-speech protest earlier in the 
1920s, during which time his wife was driven frantic by rumors that he had been handed over 
to the Klan for extra-judicial punishment.89 
Not that Fish would have admitted it, flawed police testimony offered an ironic 
testament to the truth of one of the central claims promoted by the committee: that existing 
forces were ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of counter-espionage investigations, 
especially when unsupported by a professional Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Bureau 
had rarely been staffed with professionals, and after the excesses of the post-World War One 
Red Scare had been banned from investigating political extremism altogether, which is why 
Bureau chief J. Edgar Hoover did not appear before the committee.90 Neither did the 
committee benefit from liaisons provided by Military and Naval Intelligence which had been 
available to the World War One Overman Committee but had been discontinued in 1919 in 
response to constitutional concerns over spying on citizens in peacetime.91 
Nevertheless, instead of admitting the limits of their competence, most police 
witnesses were determined to show that they were in command of the streets and described 
                                                      
88 Ibid., Part 1, vol. 4, p. 407. 
89 Ibid., Part 5, vol. 3, pp. 325-8. 
90 Fish had stated during the Rules Committee hearings of his desire to call the Bureau chief to the stand, but 
apparently Hoover had claimed he felt he did not have the right to testify, even under invitation. United States 
Congress, Hearing Before the Committee on Rules House of Representatives, Seventy-First Congress, 2nd Sess., 
on H. Res. 180 (Washington: USGPO, 1930), pp. 6-7. 
91 Roy Talbert, Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1991), pp. 148-9. 
Communist activities as well “in hand”.92 This further undermined the claim that there was an 
urgent problem to be fixed. Inspector Lyons of the NYPD’s anti-radical bureau claimed that a 
month’s worth of wholesale deportations would see “the bottom … drop out of the 
communistic movement in this country”.93 When pressed on the wisdom of federal assistance 
for local policing, Detroit’s Police Commissioner agreed it would be “a nice thing if we had a 
Federal law to stand back of us.” But this hardly amounted to a clarion call for action.94 Other 
executive branch officers also revealed strong professional incentives to show that 
Communism was under control or to resist congressional oversight over their activities. 
Achmed H. Mundo, from the Alabama governor’s office, declared in exaggerated terms that 
there were 8,000 Communist sympathizers in the state who had been shipping in tear gas 
bombs to use against the police, but swiftly added that state authorities were entirely on top 
of things.95 Indeed, A. Dana Hodson, the Chief of the State Department’s visa office, not only 
refused to testify in public session under instructions of the Secretary of State (who believed 
that undue public attention could only draw unwanted attention to the department), but also 
refused to say why he was refusing.96 
Without effective support from the police or the executive branch, Fish turned to the 
loose network of patriotic and veterans’ groups on hand to promote the anticommunist 
message. However, many of these also performed badly. Walter S. Steele, editor of National 
Republic magazine, was unprepared for the hearings, having only been called at the last 
minute, and was taken to task by Representative Bachmann for making excessive, 
unsubstantiated claims about Communist activity. On the same day, Bachmann also attacked 
the General Counsel of the Daughters of the American Revolution, H. Ralph Burton, for 
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exaggerating America’s vulnerability to internal subversion, and mocked suggestions that the 
Communist propaganda might manage to demoralize the armed forces.97 
Undoubtedly the strongest testimony against the Communist Party in America came 
from the leadership of the American Federation of Labor, whose accounts of Communist 
activities were based on experiences fighting them for control of the union movement for 
more than a decade. In the context of a badly weakened anticommunist community, the AFL 
came to form much of the motive force behind the committee. Matthew Woll, the current 
Vice President of the organization, stated that unemployment riots were solely caused by the 
Comintern, while John Lewis of the United Mine Workers complained that radicals were 
seeking “to impose their boiler plate, oriential [sic] philosophy upon the western world.” 98 
AFL agent Edward McGrady told how, during efforts to resist Communist influence in the 
fur workers unions, "Men who were more courageous than the average were beaten into 
insensibility” while people who refused to collaborate with radicals found “gangs of men 
were sent into their homes, their furniture was destroyed, their women folk insulted and in 
some cases assaulted.”99 
Even here, though, the committee’s agenda was undermined by the distinctive 
priorities of their witnesses. AFL representatives honed the argument first popularized by 
Samuel Gompers earlier in the century, that the first and last line of defense against 
Communism was a powerful union movement. William Green, President of the AFL, framed 
this in apocalyptic terms. In his view the British and German trade union movements had 
saved their nations from Communism, while the absence of trade unionism in Russia was the 
reason why it fell to Bolshevism.100 If such testimony strengthened claims that Communism 
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was an unhealthy presence in American life, it weakened the case for government action to 
fight it. Some union officials supported calls for a federal secret police force, but generally 
the desire to legitimize the union movement caused them to stress that the non-Communist 
trade unionists “will handle it.” 101 
Perhaps the only force that could have countered these contradictory messages and 
consolidated the support of influential groups behind Fish’s anticommunist campaign was 
business, which would become the lynchpin of resurgent conservative anticommunist politics 
in mid-century.102 However, in 1930 business groups revealed themselves to be deeply 
divided over Communism. Companies that had been directly targeted by Communist-led 
strikes were eager to send representatives to testify against the party.103 But a surprising 
number of corporations and professional bodies showed no real interest in the issue. Indeed, 
representatives of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, Georgia Manufacturers’ Association 
and the Citizens’ Committee of Detroit all explained that they generally left such issues to the 
police.104 
Viewed with hindsight, this appears surprising. However, much of this indifference 
was driven by straightforward commercial factors as business groups divided according to 
their positions along the supply chain rather than on simple fault lines between employers and 
employees. Primary producers who were threatened by cheap Russian imports – especially 
the lumber and pulpwood companies of the Pacific Northwest, the Association of Manganese 
Producers of America, and iron ore miners – were quick to buy into the idea that the Soviet 
government was employing unfair dumping tactics for political ends. Hearings in Seattle and 
Portland were almost overwhelmed by representatives from lumber companies and logging 
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unions who were suffering under the pressure of the depression and keen to make the case for 
protection.105 By contrast, secondary industries – such as steel producers who benefited from 
cheap manganese supplies and some of the larger paper companies who relied upon wood 
imports for production – had no interest in cutting off cheap imports, and manufacturers who 
had developed export relations with Soviet Russia at a time when domestic demand was 
collapsing sought to minimize fears of communism altogether. Indeed, the General Manager 
at Ford, Charles E. Sorenson, not only challenged the suppositions of the committee directly 
but also gave interviews to the press criticizing the idea of a federal police force, saying “If 
the Reds are as explosive and can do what they boast in America, then there is something 
wrong with our system.”106 In a tense and somewhat hostile session with the congressmen, 
Sorenson was forced to backtrack. Nevertheless, he insisted that Ford had dozens of Russian 
engineers working with them in Michigan and that their relations with Amtorg had been of 
only the highest order.107 
As a result, more often than not the attempt to deploy anticommunist arguments in 
favor of protectionism ended up turning one set of American businessmen against another. 
Looking at their corporate customers with unconcealed anger, one iron ore producer declared 
that “the political stomach turns at the sight of American steel and Soviet Russia in the same 
bed.”108 Union leaders opportunistically joined these patriotic attacks on multinational 
manufacturing industries; John Lewis declared that any businessman who traded with the 
Russians might as well be a Soviet agent.109 
                                                      
105 Ibid., Part 5, vol. 1. See also http://depts.washington.edu/depress/fish_committee.shtml [accessed 2 August 
2011]. 
106 ‘Ford Chief Back; Doubts Red Menace’, New York Times, July 15, 1930. 
107 Fish Committee, Part 4, vol. 1, p. 304; ‘Ford Chief Alters Statement on Reds’, New York Times, July 27, 
1903. This was a notable contrast to Ford’s attitude during the Dies committee hearings, when the company 
offered to supply HUAC and its staff with cars. Ellen Schrecker, Many Are The Crimes: McCarthyism in 
America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998), p. 91.  
108 Fish Committee, Part 1, vol. 4, p. 78. 
109 Ibid., Part 4, vol. 3, p. 78. 
Perhaps the most intriguing case in which the arguments of the committee were 
frustrated by divisions within the business world came in an extended debate over a series of 
financial operations by Soviet traders on the Chicago Stock Exchange: the original home of 
the derivative. Soviet representatives had made a series of large purchases of grain futures 
through Chicago trading houses, hoping to hedge their sales in a declining European market. 
Since these trades related to several million tons of wheat, and since the Soviets were 
involved in short trading, wheat producers claimed that the deals were part of a scheme to 
depress the American grain market and exacerbate the already intense sense of crisis among 
American wheat farmers who were witnessing the collapse of their livelihoods. After the 
story became public, farmers’ associations, aided by Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, accused 
the Russians of “communistic activities … threatening the welfare of the American farmer” 
and forced through a temporary embargo on certain Soviet goods.110 In early 1931, this was 
followed up by bills put to congress to embargo the importation of all Soviet products and 
strengthen restrictions on the importation of goods produced by forced labor.111 
The problem was that the committee’s argument made no sense to anyone with a 
basic understanding of the stock market. As a series of traders insistently and repeatedly 
pointed out to the confused congressmen, short selling was a perfectly normal operation and 
was designed to stabilize the price of commercial exports not collapse the market. If the 
Soviets had wanted to engineer a panic, they would not have bought quietly and in the largest 
grain market in the world, they would have signaled their intent very publicly and targeted a 
smaller market, such as Liverpool, England, in order to maximize the psychological and 
material impact of their purchases. Indeed, one did not need to understand the function of 
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derivatives trading to realize that the idea of generating a panic in secret was a contradiction 
in terms. As it was, the supposedly enormous volumes of trading turned out, to America’s 
financial wizards, to be not much more than that taking place on a normal day and certainly 
not enough to have substantially affected prices. This was especially true when compared to 
the carnage wrought in the markets by the global glut in supply of key commodities such as 
wheat – against which the Soviets had been trying to hedge in the first place.112 
Certain that there was a nefarious conspiracy at work, the congressmen nevertheless 
continued to insist that short trading was not about price insurance but “gambling”, 
subterfuge and economic warfare. Since Soviet “economic warfare” as articulated by Fish 
and Walsh was precisely supposed to follow from the Soviet’s unfair, anti-competitive, anti-
capitalist instincts, it could hardly have been more ironic that the behavior for which the 
committee was attacking the Soviet Union was in fact an instance of the Soviets operating in 
a particularly capitalistic manner. Among other things, it showed that, like many Americans 
at the time, the committee members did not properly understand the mechanics of the free 
market system that they were so vigorously defending. As Edmund Wilson pointed out, “one 
of the most striking features of this Committee which has been investigating the Communists 
for six months is its apparent ignorance of everything connected with Communism… And 
they not only ask Foster what he understands by Communism, a question perhaps defensible 
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 Not all of the committee’s claims were red herrings. If he lacked the faculties to answer his 
own questions, Congressman Fish’s endeavors revealed a genuine attempt to highlight the 
challenge Communism posed to a liberal, republican political order. For this, the committee 
deserves to be removed from the blanket “McCarthyite” designation commonly applied to 
right-wing anticommunists. While he and his fellow congressmen tended to respond to 
difficult issues with closed and prejudicial assumptions, at certain moments their efforts, 
however inarticulately, raised serious questions about a world system in which communism 
and capitalism competed on entirely conflicting terms. Historians often argue that their job is 
to give voice to the voiceless and make sense of the apparently contradictory expressions of 
the inarticulate, to interpret the views of individuals lacking the ability to clearly express 
themselves in order to separate kernels of truth from apparently discordant utterances. 
Perhaps this instruction should be as true for Republican politicians educated at fine public 
schools and among the elites at Harvard as for the oppressed, the weak and the excluded. 
However, even while he steered clear of more extremist visions of communism, Fish 
was never fully able to make the leap toward a purely evidential and institutional analysis of 
the movement he opposed. Unable to escape its members’ prejudices or avoid the perennial 
politician’s temptation to link the anticommunist crusade to the pressing concerns of the day, 
the committee found itself falling into an intellectual double bind. Efforts to demonstrate 
rigor and fidelity to the American liberal tradition and anticipate attacks from left-wingers 
encouraged the committee to define Communism through reference to its authoritarian and 
illiberal features. However, logic dictated that, if this were true, the best way of responding to 
Communist totalitarianism would be through the expansion of liberty to those who as yet did 
not feel its benefits, sweeping the rug from under revolutionaries who claimed that the 
American system was incapable of reform. This challenged the conservative inclinations of 
Hamilton Fish and his peers, whose preferred prescriptions were immigration restriction, 
policing, and ritualistic patriotic education. Even the committee’s efforts to stress the basic 
loyalty of ethnic and racial minority groups ended up undermining the case for action, since 
doing so challenged the vision of a powerful, united and dangerous Communist movement. 
As a result, the committee’s final report, issued in January 1931, presented a set of 
conclusions that were in stark dissonance to the messages that had emerged during the 
hearings. While witnesses’ testimony in 1930 had revealed forged evidence, conflicting 
testimony, lackadaisical police officers and self-reliant trade unionists, the Fish Committee 
assembled from these fragments a vision of a disciplined Communist movement with more 
than half a million members and “active sympathizers”, on the verge of driving the United 
States into the ground. Despite the explanations provided by some of Chicago’s most 
experienced businessmen, claims of economic warfare on the trading floors were restated 
uncritically.  
The Whalen Documents, the sources on which the committee had been founded, were 
dismissed in less than a paragraph. This marked a fitting epitaph for the committee, and a 
demonstration of how far the fear of imminent revolution had diminished in the months 
during which the Fish Committee had been conducting its investigations. Once the initial 
shock of the crash had receded (and before politics began to polarize once again in the New 
Deal years), many Americans seemed to have been surprised not by the fragility of their 
compatriots’ republican faith but by its resilience. “The Chairman seems honestly to believe 
that there is imminent danger of a Communist revolution here, and that our Government and 
our institutions may be overthrown unless we adopt radical measures,” a New York Times 
editorial averred. “This is not the judgment of our police authorities, or of the keenest and 
most impartial observers… Indeed, the wonder is that, given the favorable conditions for 
violent agitation during the past fourteen months, there have been so few demonstrations by 
Communists.”114 
It was little surprise, then, that the committee’s recommendations, which included 
outlawing the Communist Party, cancelling the citizenship of all party members who had 
previously been naturalized, barring Communist propaganda from the mails, prosecuting 
people caught spreading rumors about banks and a complete embargo on all Soviet trade, 
were ignored. The only liberal member of the committee, John E. Nelson, refused to sign the 
report. Denouncing anticommunist “hysteria”, he said that “our best defense against the red 
shirt of the Communist and the black shirt of the Fascists is the blue shirt of the American 
working man.”115 
In this sense, and not for the last time, right-wing anticommunists’ lax approach to 
evidence and argument made them their own worst enemies. As Boris Skvirsky, the Director 
of the Soviet Union’s Information Bureau in New York, pointed out in his statement to the 
committee, allegations about the Bolshevik destruction of civilization were part of a “fine 
harvest of stories” that dated back to the absurd post-war claims about the Soviet 
nationalization of women, while the forged Whalen Documents were “quite similar to 
previous forgeries” designed to build up a “war psychology against the Soviet Union.”116 
This consistent pattern of failure was more than enough to pull a curtain over the legitimate 
points being made by the committee about the international Communist movement, which 
were effectively ignored by many Americans for a generation to come. 
Still, the failure of the Fish committee was not solely a product of the intellectual 
limitations or analytical errors of the congressmen who sat on its benches. It was both shaped 
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by and reflected in the composition of the witnesses who were called to testify before it, 
which in turn spoke to the systemic weakness of anticommunism in the depression years. 
Critics were wrong to argue that the committee was little more than the mouthpiece of 
capitalism. The most consistently conservative anticommunist groups, whose vision would 
have most strongly supported the committee’s dogmatic interpretation of Communism, 
presented weak or compromised evidence. Meanwhile, the most powerful indictments of 
Soviet politics came from moderate union leaders, who focused upon reform as the best 
response to revolutionary radicalism.  
In this sense, the more moderate the investigations became, the more incoherent the 
narrative they presented. Fish’s efforts were uniquely hampered by bad timing. However, 
they also highlight many of the difficulties experienced by conservative anticommunists 
hoping to work with liberals who may notionally agree with their basic hostility toward 
revolutionary radicalism but disagree profoundly with the reasons why and the implications 
they draw from it. As a result, many figures – including Fish himself – have preferred to drift 
rightwards, rather than to the center, in search of allies who shared not only their antipathy to 
Communism but many of their prescriptions for defeating it. In Fish’s case, this led to a 
systematic shift during the rest of the decade towards an implicit defense of Nazism as the 
only force on the global stage capable of restraining Soviet Russia. While by the onset of 
World War Two his committee was already disappearing from memory, this new course 
would ultimately leave his name entirely blackened in history. 
